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TRADE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE 
EASTERN BLOC: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
COMMON EXTERNAL COMMERCIAL 
POLICY FOR THE EEC 
INTRODUCTION 
New initiatives for the development of legal relations between the 
European Community and the Eastern bloc (COMECON) 1 were formu-
lated in a draft opinion delivered to the Political Affairs Committee of 
the EEC in April 1973. 2 The draft drew upon experience gained during 
several years of East-West European trade and was prompted by sub-
stantial changes in the nature . and needs of that trade. More impor-
tantly it was prompted by a heightened complexity in the dynamics 
leading to policy decisions relevant to trade with East Europe, and a 
generalized realization of this fact by Members of the Community. 
Among the sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary fac-
tors acting upon the decision-making calculus, a certain few stood at the 
fore. They included the utility of a common Community trade policy 
toward the East, and the necessity of a common Community foreign 
policy toward the East as a precondition for such a unified trade policy. 
But they also included the realization that a unified foreign policy was 
simply an unrealistic short or mid-range goal for the EEC.3 But in-
creased trade, through simplified and coordinated procedures, was con-
sidered too vital to the Community's welfare to be deferred until those 
procedures and the policies underlying them secured the necessary 
unani~ous acceptance of the Member States. Accordingly, in 1972 the 
European Parliament, through the Political Affairs Committee, com-
missioned an in-depth study of the various procedures which would 
enable the Community to form closer trade ties with the East in the 
absence of a unified transnational trade policy. 
That study, in the form of a draft opinion formulated by Hans Jahn 
has recently been presented to the Committee. It is the purpose of this 
1. As referred to in this paper, COMECON is the East European trading community: 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, established in 1959 and including East Ger-
many, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. 
2. Mommersteey Report, Resolution of 6 April 1973, O.J. No. C 26, April 30, 1973, 
at 25. 
3. Although the Treaty of Rome contemplated the development of a common com-
mercial policy, the treaty does not provide for a common foreign policy. Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, [1958] 298 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter cited 
as Treaty of Rome]. 
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article to examine the Jahn draft in context and perspective, and to offer 
some analysis and tentative conclusions as to its implications for inter-
European trade during the next several years. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EEC AND COMECON 
A. Early Soviet Attitudes Toward the EEC 
In early 1973 the outlook for EEC-COMECON commercial rela-
tions was more complicated than during the formative years of the two 
institutions. 4 The Soviet Union's attitude toward the EEC in the late 
fifties and early sixties remained one of dogmatic conviction of its rapid 
demise, an attitude more rigidly enunciated as apprehension as to its 
veracity grew more widespread among the Party elite. It was argued that 
the European Community, by fractionalizing capitalist world trade, 
would ultimately lead to the demise of capitalist society.5 Nonetheless, 
in its first four years of trade amo~g Community members, the gross 
national product of the Common Market increased rapidly.6 Conse-
quently, Moscow's subcurrent of anxiety had become justified and thus 
a new policy embodying fresh initiatives was clearly required. 
B. Soviet Reassessment of the EEC 
The success of West European integration generated a Soviet reas-
4. In 1946 the Soviet Union sought a new organization to be constructed within the 
United Nations framework which would concern itself with European economic coopera-
tion. However, with the Soviet Union's rejection of the Marshall Plan and Soviet political 
command of East European nations, the West European States resolved among them-
selves to accept the Marshall Plan and established their own organization of economic 
cooperation. See H. JUNCKERSTAFF, INTERNATIONAL MANUAL ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY 24-25, 38 (1963) [hereinafter cited as JuNCKERSTAFF]; Kaser, The EEC and 
Eastern Europe: Prospects for Trade and Finance, 49 INT'L AFF. 402, 403 (1973). 
5. The Soviet Union determined that the Common Market would be a menace to all 
Europeans in that it would mean that the economically stronger nations and large monop-
olies would be able to impose their terms on other European countries. The Soviet State-
ment on the Common Market and Euratom noted: 
The proposed abolition of customs duties within the common market would 
benefit only the largest monopolies, giving them additional profits. With the 
competitive struggle growing more acute in the common market, the lifting of 
custom duties can only lower the living standards of the people . . . since the 
monopolies will try to overcome all the difficulties created by their completion 
by ... raising taxes [and] hiking prices of consumer goods. 
N.Y. Times, March 17, 1957, at 1, col. 4. See also, Feld, The Utility of the EEC Experience 
for Eastern Europe, 8 J. COMMON MARKET STUDIES 236, 237 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
FeldJ; Schoplin, Enlargement: The Soviet View, 140 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY at 9. 
6. The first four years of the EEC, trade among members of the Community rose by 
73% and trade with the rest of the world increased by 27%. The Community's gross 
national product increased by 27% and industrial production by some 32%. EEC Doc. 
2738/pp/62 - En, April 1962. 
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sessment of its position with the European Community. A formal 
charter for COMECON was adopted giving that organization similar 
status to that of the EEC. 7 However, prior to the founding of 
COMECON the Soviet Union had exerted a strong directive force on the 
economies of her satellite nations and imposed often unbearable trade 
arrangements upon them. The resulting price discrimination and exploi-
tation foreclosed the building of a sound foundation for economic inte-
gration .11 
However in 1962, new trade initiatives with West Europe were 
deemed necessary in order to rebuild a depressed East bloc economy. 
The Moscow Institute of World Economics and International Relations 
published several new theses pertaining to the EEC under the title 
Concerning Imperialist "Integration" in Western Europe (The Common 
Market). The Franco-German alliance was recognized as the ''backbone 
of integration" and the EEC was identified with stimulated production 
and increased wages for the laboring class. 9 The European Community 
was acknowledged as having faster economic development than the 
United States, and West Europe was adjudged to be the continued 
"center of attraction" with respect to industrial production and foreign 
trade. io 
Commercial expansion in the Socialist Commonwealth had been 
met by the counter-thrust of the EEC. The People's Democracies' com-
metcial contacts with West Europe had been adversely affected by the 
European Community's tariff programs and the abolition of internal 
customs barriers. These had resulted in insulating the Community 
against relatively less expensive goods from the East and had reduced 
inter-bloc trade. 11 The Soviet Union called for international economic 
cooperation and an elimination of closed economic groupings. The 
7. COMECON (see note 2 supra) was founded by Stalin as a counterweight to the 
success of the Marshall Plan. This economic program, however, remained dormant until 
1959 when the organization was revived as a direct response to the injurious effects of the 
EEC on East-West trade. JUNCKERSTAFF, supra note 4, at 41-43. 
8. M. KASER, COMECON 15-33 (1965). 
9; FELD, supra note 5, at 238. 
10. 14 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS 9-16 (1956). Thi's "center of attraction" 
phraseology was a Soviet hyperbole designed as a warm overture toward the ideologically 
opposed, but economically indispensable EEC. An analysis of the level of foreign trade 
is noted in the Appendix. 
11. Ludaszewski, Western Integration and People's Democracies, 46 FoREIG~ AFF. 
377-80 (1968). In accordance with the principles of a customs union, Article 13 of the Rome 
Treaty provided for the abolition of the then existing customs duties within the EEC; and 
as set forth in Article 14, internal tariffs were reduced in stages. Intra-Community duties 
on industrial goods were completely abolished as of July 1, · 1968 in accordance with the 
Council decision of July 26, 1966 (0.J. No. 165, September 21, 1966); 1 CCH COMM. MKT. 
REP.~ 232.03 (1973). 
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"most-favored-nation" principle became the password and penetration 
of "closed economic blocs" became the Soviet goal. In this early sixties 
transitional period the objective of the Eastern bloc was the develop-
ment of mutually advantageous trade relations. 12 This extremely impor-
tant policy decision was reflective of and motivated by one central fact: 
the East, by the interplay of increased trade with the EEC, would be-
come exposed to and learn the intricacies of a successful policy of 
economic integration. 
Thus, while trade was seen as a necessity for the revitalization of 
COMECON, political infection was to be avoided while carrying it out. 
The first commercial contacts between the Western states and the 
Soviet camp remained both bilateral and very businesslike with tough 
bargains and strict readings of the contracts exchanged. 13 By the mid-
sixties an expanded pattern of trade had begun. However, the diversities 
in methodology and procedures between the two blocs, which impeded 
a free flow of trade, remained to be surmounted. 
C. External Relations of the EEC as a Customs Union 
The Treaty of Rome gave the European Community the power to 
enter into special external relations in only a few limited instances. 
Article 237 14 of the Treaty allows any European State to apply to become 
a member of the EEC and Article 238 provides that the Community may 
conclude with a third state, a union of states or an international organi-
zation, agreements establishing an association involving special proce-
dures and reciprocal rights and,obligations. 15 Most importantly Articles 
12. Ginsburgs, The Kremlin and the Common Market: A Conspectus, 37 SOCIAL 
REsEARCH 296, 301 (1969). 
13. 14 CURRENT DIGF13T OF THE SOVIET PRESS, 9, 16 (1956). 
14. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 237 states: 
Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall 
address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtain-
ing the opinion of the Commission. The conditions of admission and the adjust-
ments to this Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement 
between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be 
submitted for ratification by all the Contracting States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
15. The Court of Justice, in an adjudication of a dispute arising from negotiations 
carried out with third countries by each Member State in regard to working conditions 
for crews of vehicles engaged in international transport, discussed in dictum the relevance 
of some Articles of the Treaty which affect EEC external relations. The Court emphasized 
that the bases for Community foreign relation powers can be found in Articles 111-116 and 
238. However, these Articles were deemed to be special provisions and to consider these 
specialia as generalia would be a very bold legal construction. Nonetheless, the Court 
noted that the Community should be granted foreign relation powers in areas where it is 
necessary. Commission v. Council (E.R.T.A. Case), Ct. of Justice, Case No. 22/70, 31/3/71. 
17 Recueil at 263, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.~ 8134 (1972). 
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110-115 provide for the creation of a common commercial policy. 
Article 111111 sets forth the common commercial policy which was to 
be achieved during the transitional period ending on December 31, 1969. 
The Member States were to coordinate their trade accords with third 
countries, while the Commission was to have submitted to the Council 
proposals regarding the procedure for achieving a uniform policy on a 
common customs tariff. Further, the Commission was to make all ap-
propriate recommenrlations to the Member States in order to secure a 
high level of uniformity. Accordingly, Article 11217 obliged the Member 
16. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 111 states: 
The following provisions shall, without prejudice to Articles 115 and 116, 
apply during the transitional period. 
1. Member States shall coordinate their trade relations with third countries so 
as to bring about, by the end of the transitional period the conditions needed 
for implementing a common policy in the field of external trade. 
The Commission shall submit to the Council proposals regarding the proce-
dure for common action to be followed during the transitional period and regard-
ing the achievement of uniformity in their commercial policies. 
2. The Commission shall submit to the Council recommendations for tariff 
negotiations with third countries in respect of the common customs tariff. 
The Cpuncil shall authorize the Commission to open such negotiations. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a 
special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this 
task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to 
it. 
3. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall 
act unanimously during the first two stages and by a qualified majority there-
after. 
4. Member States shall, in consultations with the Commission, take all neces-
sary measures, particularly those designed to bring about an adjustment of tariff 
agreements in force with third countries, in order that the entry into force of the 
common customs tariff shall not be delayed. 
5. Member States shall aim at securing as high a level of uniformity as possible 
between themselves as regards their liberalization lists in relation to third coun-
tries or groups of third countries. To this end, the Commission shall make all 
appropriate recommendations to Member States. 
If. Member States abolish or reduce quantitative restrictions in relation to 
third countries, they shall inform the Commission beforehand and shall accord 
the same treatment to other Member States. 
17. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 112 states: 
1. Without prejudice to obligations undertaken by them within the framework 
of other international organizations, Member States shall, before the end of the 
transitional period, progressively harmonize the systems whereby they grant aid 
for exports to third countries, to the extent necessary to ensure that competition 
between undertakings of the Community is not distorted. 
On a proposal from the Commission, the Council, shall, acting unanimously 
until the end of the second stage, and by a qualified majority thereafter, issue 
any directives needed for this purpose. 
2. The preceding provisions shall not apply to such drawbacks of customs 
duties or charges having equivalent effect not to such repayment of indirect 
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States to progressively harmonize those systems whereby each member 
grants aid for exports to third countries in order to insure that 
competition between th~ States in the Community is not distorted. 
Similarly Article 113111 stipulates that after the transitional period has 
ended uniform principles shall form the basis of the common commer-
cial policy, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates. Finally, 
Article 115rn allows the Member States to request application of a safe-
guard procedure whenever the execution of measures of a uniform com-
mercial policy would lead to a deflection of trade or economic difficulties 
in a Member State. The Commission is thereby authorized to recom-
mend the methods for the requisite cooperation between Member 
States; and the States may in the case of "urgency," take the necessary 
taxation including turnover taxe's, excise duties and other indirect taxes as is 
allowed when goods are exported from a Member State to a third country, in so 
far as such drawback or repayment does not exceed the amount imposed, di-
rectly or indirectly, on the products exported. 
18. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 113 states: 
1. After the transitional period has ended, the common commercial policy 
shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff 
rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniform-
ity in measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade 
such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies. 
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the 
common commercial policy. 
3. Where agreements with third countries need to be negotiated, the Commis-
sion shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorize the 
Commission to open the necessary negotiations. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a 
special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this 
task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to 
it. 
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall 
act by a qualified majority. 
19. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 115 states: 
In order to ensure that the execution of measures of commercial policy taken in 
accordance with this Treaty by any Member State is not obstructed by deflec-
tion of trade, or where differences between such measures lead to economic 
difficulties in one or more of the Member States, the Commission shall recom-
mend the methods for the requisite cooperation between Member States. Failing 
this, the Commission shall authorize Member States to take the necessary pro-
tective measures, the conditions and details of which it shall determine. 
In case of urgency during the transitional period, Member States may 
themselves take the necessary measures and shall notify them to the other 
Member States and to the Commission, which may decide that the States 
concerned shall amend or abolish such measures. 
In the selection of such measures, priority shall be given to those which 
cause the least disturbance to the functioning of the common market and which 
take into account the need to expedite, as far as possible, the introduction of 
the common customs tariff. 
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measures themselves for the protection of their economies upon notice 
to the other Mem her States and to the Commission. 
Therefore, although the Treaty provides for commercial relations 
with non-Member States coordinated in such a way that the develop-
ment of a common commercial policy will ultimately be brought about, 
the Treaty does not set forth a real basis for a uniform foreign policy 
whereby the united expectations and interests of each Member State 
may implement a common foreign trade accord. 
D. An Evaluation of COMECON vis-a-vis the EEC 
Along with the want of a uniform foreign policy in the European 
Community, the dissimilarity between the two commercial systems 
remains a significant hindrance to multilateral initiatives. The central 
problem of COMECON is the lack of effective economic integration. 
Long term economic plans have been duplicated by the various states 
and the lack of a common pricing system in the Eastern bloc nations 
has impeded trade policies based on considerations of cost advantages. 20 
Furthermore, unlike the EEC, the flow of capital between COMECON 
nations and the free movement of labor is very limited. The EEC has 
made advances toward a supra-national body while COMECON has 
not. 
The utility of the EEC experiences for the Eastern bloc is that the 
Common Market has succeeded not only in establishing a customs 
union, but also in arranging for the free movement of persons and capi-
tal, collaboration in border-crossing and a common agricultural policy; 
significant lessons from which COMECON might well draw valuable 
direction.21 The forces against these achievements in the People's De-
mocracies have been the diffidence of the Eastern states to supra-
nationalism as exemplified by the Rumanian and Albanian opposition 
to Soviet encroachment upon their national affairs. The possibility of 
an independent customs union excluding the Soviet Union would re-
quire a transformation of political systems toward the Yugoslav pat-
tern. 22 The political impasse in this area as well as the diversification of 
20. See Feld, supra note 5, at 244-45. 
21. Id. at 240-50. 
22. There are few restrictions in the autonomies of Yugoslavian business firms, in 
comparison to other East European nations. The Yugoslav economic system is decentral-
ized and self-management of enterprises is emphasized. Property is not State-owned but 
rather held in trust by the firm for society and firms are run by managers selected by 
workers in the enterprise. Further, business firms can be formed by governmental units, 
trade associations, existing enterprises, or private citizens. 
Centralization, however, still prevails in the area of enterprise accounts which are 
kept according to a uniform accounting system; accounts are audited by a federal 
government service. See Dirlam, Problem of Market Power and Public Policy in Yugosla-
via, in M. BORNSTEIN, COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 236-40 (1969). 
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the two trading communities remains significant. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Despite the ideological and commercial differences separating the 
two trading blocks, a pattern of trade did commence on a bilateral 
basis. 2:1 By the mid-sixties Western European trade made significant 
inroads to the Eastern market (see Appendix, Tables 1 & 2) . The eco-
nomic opportunities offered by the West resulted in significant inter-
bloc commerce which, analyzed on a transactional basis, meant more 
to COMECON than it did to the European Community. A single 
example of this pronounced EEC-oriented thrust among COMECON 
countries is seen in the case of Rumania, where Western exports and 
imports constituted approximately fifty percent of the country's total 
international trade. 24 
From these initial trade agreements COMECON sought to develop 
her sagging economy. As ;;i corollary, convertible currency was welcomed 
since it enabled these states to expand exports and receive a larger 
amount of goods.25 
Bilateralism has offered a tactical advantage to COMECON. With 
the increase of international trade with the West, COMECON had the 
ability to disrupt Western economy through discriminatory pricing. No 
market pressure, on a unified basis, was directed by the EEC on COME-
CON. Had the West depended increasingly on East bloc trade, the 
relatively low prices of COMECON imports could have been quickly 
raised or the State-trading nations could have easily engaged in dump-
ing, thereby causing economic disturbances in the West. COMECON, 
however, still sought "most-favored-nation" benefits with the EEC 
members, contending that all internal tariff cuts should be extended to 
the State-trading nations. 26 Therefore, although the East bloc insisted 
that the EEC was "illegal" conceptually, COMECON sought the same 
tariff concessions as provided for Community members. 
The EEC safeguard procedure also presented problems. As West 
Germany imported technical equipment from the East, and Italy sought 
raw materials from the Soviet Union, tension within the Community 
developed. One nation could restrict the flow of mechanical equipment 
or raw materials within the Community through national safeguards 
23. In 1963, the Soviet Minister for Trade refused to accept a document from the 
Dutch ambassador to the Soviet Union containing EEC offers for trade concessions, be-
cause the Community was not recogr\ized by the East as a commercial unit . However, the 
State-trading countries were attracted by the prosperity of the European Community and 
consequently sought bilateral cooperation. w. FELD, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND 
THE WORLD 149 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FELD, EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET]. 
24. Id. at 151. 
25. Id. at 245. 
26. WEIL, 'A FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? 285 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WEIL]. 
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sanctioned by Article 11527 of the Treaty. These national safeguards, if 
applied increasingly, could damage the customs union. As one Member 
State freed more trade with East Europe and a second Community· 
member felt that this measure could lead to her own economic difficul-
ties, protective measures were to be authorized by the Commission. 28 
The Commission, however, has been reluctant to make judgments 
in this area because in so doing it would inevitably have to choose 
between the conflicting concerns of the several nations involved. There-
fore, as the result of external competition for COMECON business by 
national industrial enterprises, coupled with the extensive divergence of 
each Member State's foreign policy objectives and the failure of the 
"EEC Clause, " 211 the formation of a uniform commercial policy has been 
delayed. 
Furthermore, commercial relations with COMECON are very much 
determined by credit terms, along with barter transactions and coopera-
tion in the construction of industrial complexes. The extension of credit 
has created a strain on the development of a common commercial pol-
icy. Although the commercial policy deadline was set for 1970, time 
limits on the extension of credits have been requested by Member 
States. COMECON nations have received generous credit from the 
Community members; this has resulted primarily from intra-EEC com-
petition. France, for example, has pressed for no limits on giving credits 
due to her increased trade with the East and has likewise contended that 
27. See note 19 supra. 
28. In this vein, Professor Weil writes: 
All members except the Netherlands made regular appeal to the safeguard 
procedure authorized under Article 115 of the Rome Treaty, but with increased 
national liberalization, recourse to this article has diminished. For example, 
when France freed about three-quarters of its trade with Eastern Europe at the 
beginning of 1966, it no longer needed to have recourse to Article 115 because 
of measures adopted by others~ Italy and Germany on the other hand, were 
placed in the position of asking for safeguard action because of the French 
decision. 
WEIL, supra note 26, at 286. 
29. The "EEC Clause" was to be implanted in all bilateral agreements. The "Clause" 
which was enacted by the Council of Ministers decision of July 20, 1960, held: 
When the obligations resulting from the Treaty instituting the EEC and relative 
to the progressive creation of a common commercial policy shall make it neces-
sary, negotiations will be begun in the shortest time possible in order to make 
any necessary changes in this agreement. 
WEIL, supra note 26, at 227; EEC Council Decision, O.J. No. 71, at 1274, 4/11/61. The 
Council further called for uniform commercial agreements and if the "EEC Clause" was 
not contained in bilateral accords, such agreement could continue for only one year. 
However, the initiatives meant little or nothing. East Europe rejected "Clause" since it 
would imply recognition of a unified EEC and the member states did not follow the one 
year time limit set forth in the decision. See WEIL, supra note 26. 
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her credit arrangements are not in violation of Article 11230 relating to 
distortions of competition. On the other hand, COMECON profited by 
the extension of such credit arrangements. 31 
The Protocol Concerning Internal German Trade and Connected 
Problems:iz of the Rome Treaty has been criticized by both trading blocs. 
West Germany's close contacts with East Germany has lead several 
COMECON states to charge that East Germany has become a de facto 
associate Member of the EEC. The Protocol accords the German 
Democratic Republic a special close status in the West, since trade 
between the two Germanys is considered internal; products imported 
from the G .D.R. to the West are not regulated by the common customs 
tariff or the common agricultural policy. G.D.R. imports are guaranteed 
free circulation and reduced turnover tax rates solely with West Ger-
many. Bonn considers this duty-free intra-German trade agreement as 
an essential ingredient of her "Grundvertrage": a basic treaty affectuat- · 
ing closer relations between the two Germanys.33 However, the Protocol 
may in fact injure EEC trade since there has been no common commer-
cial policy. Third-country goods in many instances are imported into the 
G.D.R. and consequently many of these products enter West Germany 
levy and duty free. Ultimately these goods compete with EEC prod-
ucts. :11 
30. See note 17 supra. 
31. WEIL, supra note 26, at 279. A recent Council decision on consultation and infor-
mation procedures in matters of credit insurance, credit guarantees and financial credits 
has been established. The decision notes that in the course of a consultation in the 
granting of a credit arrangement with a third country or to exporters or to financial 
institutions-whether public or private in nature-a Member State or the Commission 
should request oral consultation and any Member State involved in such a credit arrange-
ment must every six months thereafter, give notification of the use made of that arrange-
ment. Further, the duration of any credit granted, whether supplier credit or financial 
credit must not exceed five years. The five year limit as to capital goods consisting of 
individual items usable in themselves and capital goods for complete plants or factories, 
is calculated as commencing on the date on which the buyer is to take physical possession 
of the goods. Council Decision, 73/391, O.J. No. L. 346/1, 17/12/73. 
32. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, [1958] 298 
U.N.T.S. 199. 
33 . In August 1970, Chancellor Brandt concluded an historic treaty with the Soviet 
Union beginning normal relations with the U.S.S.R. In December 1970, Brandt signed a 
similar treaty with Poland which included the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the 
permanent Polish-German border. Accordingly postal and transport agreements were rati-
fied with East Germany, culminating in 1972 with the signing of a basic intra-German 
accord whereby each state will have a permanent representative in the capital of the other. 
The treaty emphasizes that differences will be resolved by peaceful means, territorial 
sovereignty will be respected and that there will be cooperative ventures between the two 
states in the areas of transport, posts, public health, cultural exchanges, science, environ-
mental protection and increased economic ventures. Braunthal, West Germany 's Foreign 
Policy, 64 CURRENT HISTORY 150, 151, 153 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Braunthal]. 
34. 201 EuROMARKET NEWS 2 (1972) . 
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Bilateral trade bargains, primarily initiated by the Soviet planning 
and foreign trade organizations, have resulted in higher levels of East-
West trade. The significant factor of low credit terms has given COME-
CON favorable trade agreements. Nevertheless, as we have seen, such 
bilateral accords have impeded the establishment of a common com-
mercial policy. Although a majority of the political parties and economic 
officials and ministries within each Member State have favored a com-
mon policy, the lack of agreements on the principles of such a policy 
among EEC nations, as well as opposition by large national business 
firms, have made a unified strategy a present-day impossibility.35 As a 
consequence of this resistance, COMECON was free to conclude bilat-
eral bargains, and the response by West European firms has been a 
scramble for Eastern bloc business. An appropriate scenario for a uni-
form policy had not been achieved by the mid-sixties. The political 
factor of European detente was the necessary impetus for a new eco-
nomic ideology. 
III. THE JAHN DRAFT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY IN THE 1970'8 
A. Re-Evaluation of Economic Priorities with COMECON 
The spirit of detente which has pervaded Europe in most recent 
years is embodied in Hans Jahn's draft opinion for consideration by the 
Political Affairs Committee of the EEC Parliament. The thrust of the 
report speaks to the implementation of a basic common commercial-
foreign policy.:16 Jahn's opinion assumes the political reality that al-
though the State-trading countries are of different social and economic 
orders, the status quo in the East must be accepted and that ideological 
differences should not prevent good neighborly relations from being at-
tained through peaceful trade endeavors. 
The prerequisite for this plan is a homogeneity of goals and security 
interests, with continued efforts for integration within the Community. 
Jahn, however, does not provide a formulation for a unified effort by 
each Member State within a detente atmosphere. If peaceful endeavors 
are constructed by each nation in the Community separately, a unified 
commercial policy may still be a mere vision of the distant futureY It 
may be contended, however, that the development of a common com-
mercial policy is grounded on the unfolding of new, perhaps united, 
political ideologies with respect to East Europe through the efforts of 
West Germany's Ostpolitik and the Conference on Security and Cooper-
35. FELD, EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET, supra note 23, at 153-54. 
36. EEC Doc. PE 23. 956/rev., 17/8/73. 
37. FELD, EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET, supra note 23, at 153-54. 
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ation in Europe (CSCE).:111 
From a commercial standpoint, the bilateral system of trade has 
undergone changes, as noted in a Chatham House report, in four signifi-
cant areas. First, the unilateral liberalization by each Member State of 
its import restrictions; second, in many instances bilateral trade agree-
ments have lost their economic substance; third, East Europe's "mini-
mum" planning is more widely applied today to import management; 
fourth, as more East bloc nations are manufacturing and exporting 
finished products to the EEC, this will "gradually transform the tradi-
tional structure of exchanges between Western manufactured products 
and Eastern foodstuffs and raw materials and weaken the case for the 
old type of bilateralism which accompanied it. " 39 Consequently the need 
for ex-ante bilateral balancing of trade calls for uniform negotiations to 
confront these new levels of exchange from the State-trading nations.40 
Jahn also stresses that since commercial relations with the East 
bloc are determined by barter transactions, there is a need for coopera-
tion in the development of industrial complexes, credit terms, common 
rules and uniform principles.41 
An effort toward such cooperation was established in December 
1969. 12 The Commission of the EEC was given the power to restrict 
agricultural imports if they exceeded a certain amount or could cause 
disruption of the Common Agricultural Policy. CAP's price and levy 
system was to be observed. Article 11343 was therefore implemented and 
the ensuing regulation stressed that with the end of the transitional 
period, the common commercial policy must be based on uniform prin-
38. The CSCE is a multilateral conference including representatives from the nations 
of Europe (except Albania), The United States and Canada, which commenced on the 
ambassadorial level in January 1973. The agenda deals with economic and cultural ex-
change and expanded trade contracts between East and West. 
39. Ransom, The Future of EEC-COMECON Relations, 27 THE WORLD TODAY 438, 
446 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ransom]. 
40. In this vein, Professor Ransom writes: 
Progress towards economic integration in Western and Eastern Europe poses 
innumerable problems of adjustment, both within the two groups and between 
them, to a new scale of economic organization. The harmonious solution of these 
problems requires: firstly, that each side accepts economic integration in the 
other as a logical ... process; secondly, that each side recognize liberal policies 
as the best safeguard against economic confrontation between the two groups; 
thirdly, that the achievement of rational economic relations between the two 
groups becomes a major objective of foreign policy on both sides. 
Id. at 447-48. 
41. EEC Doc. PE 32. 056/rev., at 8.17/8/73. 
42. Reg. No. 109/70, 0.J. No. 1 19, p. 1, 19/12/69. This regulation attempted to 
establish common rules for imports of a wide variety of goods from the State-trading 
countries. 
43. See note 18 supra. 
12
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 2, No. 1 [1974], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol2/iss1/6
1974] Comments 91 
ciples and common rules for the importation of products from the State-
trading countries. However, Jahn offers no recommendation as to t.he 
limitations placed on this regulation, in that those non-agricultural 
products not mentioned in the tegulation may be imported into any part 
of the Community without quantitative restrictions and that the 
protective-safeguard measures noted in Article 11544 may also be applied 
by the Commission when import trends may damage the economic and 
commercial situations in each Member State. Furthermore, the regula-
tion empowers the Member States in certain circumstances, provided 
that their actions are on an interim basis, to take protective measures 
individually. However, a more successful effort toward a common policy 
was initiated with the establishment of a single tariff applied equally 
for all imported goods-the Common External Tariff (CET) as noted in 
Article 19/' which was in force in 1968. Nonetheless, Jahn also fails 
to assess the possibility that the spectre of a European technocratic-
capitalistic commercial entity might dissuade East European govern-
ments from joining with the EEC in close commercial relations, which 
espouse a radically different political ideology. 46 If COMECON mem-
bers were able to barter at times with industrial firms bilaterally, does 
this mean that they will confront multi-national monopolies? Also, the 
Soviet Union's political conception of a unified COMECON-more 
closely tied, therefore more easily controlled-will no doubt meet re-
sistance within the East bloc. Consequently, a unified West confronting 
independent State-trading countries may actually repulse rather than 
attract COMECON trade. 
The best policy for the European Community in this area would be 
to let the Soviet Union develop a more unified COMECON which could 
then approach the EEC on a multilateral basis. COMECON has a 
Standing Commission on Foreign Trade which advises the State-trading 
countries on commercial transactions with the Community, and joint 
procedures for bilateral agreements have been discussed. 47 This possibil-
44. See note 19 supra. 
45. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 19 states: 
1. Subject to the conditions and within the limits provided for hereinafter, 
duties in the common customs tariff shall be at the level of the arithmetical 
average of the duties applied in the four customs territories comprised in the 
Community. 
46. COMECON is not a monolithic group in the sense that its State-trading nations 
have historically bargained as a unified entity. Rather the COMECON States have en-
gaged in bargaining on the national level. See note 48 infra. 
47. KOEHLER, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE SOVIET BLOC 96 (1965); see also Feld, 
supra note 5, at 251. 
The new COMECON institutions: The Investment Bank, Scientific-Technological 
Information Center and the International Institute for Economic Problems of the World 
Socialist System have analyzed the internal economic integration of the People's Democ-
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ity of a multilateral COMECON may be within Soviet political aspira-
tions and may be the necessary catalyst for the development of a com-
mon trade policy within the Community. The "Brezhnev Doctrine"48 
can be re-enforced and conveniently broadened by an interpretation 
which sanctions the Kremlin's coordinating the economic policies of 
East Europe to meet the goals set by Moscow. The 1969 COMECON 
Executive Committee meeting in Berlin may substantiate this view. 
There the Soviet officials discussed the formation of a new supra-
national COMECON. 4!1 Effective economic integration is essential to 
COMECON cohesion and the- Gra.nd Master of economic policy in 
Moscow may compel stronger intra-COMECON ties. Consequently, 
as COMECON evolves to a multilateral framework the EEC may more 
readily approach the State-trading countries as a unified entity with a 
common trade policy. For the indefinite future, attempts at nurturing 
detente with Moscow should be pursued by each Member State individ-
ually. 
B. The Further Development of Detente 
The Jahn Report notes that the possible solutions available for a 
unified trade policy toward COMECON are dependent on detente, de-
fined as a policy of cooperation founded on reciprocity with the State-
trading countries. However, Jahn's major premise seems to be that to 
"live and let live" is potentially productive of greater individual benefit 
for both blocs than is a policy of hostility characterized by episodic 
adventures in attempted subversion.50 Jahn concludes that peace can be 
racies in the areas of monetary investments and close coordination of national plan . 
Ransom, supra note 39, at 440. International specialization and production cooperation 
through joint enterprise and investments have been emphasized by high officials of CO-
MECON as important factors leading to a single and unified economy . Id. at 440-41. 
48. The "Doctrine" justifies the Soviet Union in intervening in the affairs of the 
Peoples Democracies for the protection of "legitimate" Soviet interests. 
49. However, particular resistance to COMECON as a supra-national planning organ 
was expressed by Romania, while Hungary and East Germany refused committment to 
such far reaching integration. THE ECONOMIST, January 25, 1969, at 40-41; see also Feld, 
supra note 5, at 225. 
Although both commercial and political problems have strained an effective commer-
cial community_ in the East bloc, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have recog-
nized the EEC on a "de facto" basis in agricultural matters by direct negotiations with 
the Commission in Brussels. Ransom, supra note 39, at 442. However, the tension between 
"pluralists" and "centralists" in East Europe is unresolved. Michael Kaser in analyzing 
several Chatham House Study Group reports on East-West relations noted: 
The Soviet Government's decision of April 3, 1973 to put industry into the hands 
of 'production associations,' operating . .. on the basis of autonomous profit 
making would seem to suggest that the 'pluralists' in Russia have some influ-
ence, although the retention of the all embracing power of the industrial minis-
try to issue them with orders shows scant weakening with the 'centralists.' 
Kaser, supra note 4, at 407. 
50. Jahn emphasizes that at the Paris Summit Conference of 1972, the Member 
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guaranteed permanently only if the existing social differences are re-
duced. Thus the Jahn draft, while assuming realistic trade endeavors 
with the East, complicates commercial policy with social concerns. 
The European Community will achieve its goal of a uniform com-
mercial policy toward the East only if the factors comprising the social 
ideologies of the blocs are scrupulously avoided in negotiation. Primary 
among these ideological impediments have been conflicting theories as 
to the social utility of the degree of freedom in the movement of people, 
information and ideas. Attempts at reaching detente should be further 
formulated with Moscow by each Member State during this stage of the 
EEC's political development. Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik has 
been successful in this area. The introduction of detente warmed the 
floes of East-West commercial relations . The Ostpolitik not only 
brought about affirmative political results but also had economic conse-
quences that went beyond West Germany's increased trade with the 
Soviet Union, to extended cooperation with East Europe. 51 Conflicts in 
social ideologies have been avoided by Brandt, and consequently his 
subtle Ostpolitik and Moscow's affirmative response have stimulated 
more commercial contact between the two blocs. 52 
Aside from the German initiatives, three other events may more 
readily contribute to the development of a common external commercial 
policy. First, the enlargement of the Community from a six to a nine 
Member association has begun to quell some divisions within the EEC. 
West Germany had pushed for the admission of Great Britain into the 
Community to strengthen it and to serve as a counterforce against 
French influence. The operational effect of Britain's accession to the 
EEC is that it has increased trade significance with the East. Second, 
the Moscow turnabout in recognizing the EEC as a single entity is 
significant.":i Third, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
States confirmed that the goal of a trade policy with COMECON is founded on political 
aims. The final communique of the Conference noted: 
In order to promote detente in Europe, the Conference reaffirmed its 
determination to follow a common commercial policy toward the countries of 
Eastern Europe with effect from 1 January J 0 73; the Member States declared 
their determination to promote a policy of co0peration, founded in reciprocity 
with these countries. 
EEC Doc. PE 23. 956/rev. at 8. 
51. Eighty-four percent of goods imported from the Soviet Union into West Germany 
were freed from import restrictions and trade issues were settled with Poland and East 
Germany. Braunthal, supra note 33. 
52. Newhouse, Struck Fast, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 353 (1973). 
53. EEC President Mansholt's address to the European Parliament in April 1972 
expressed the willingness of the EEC to envisage economic cooperation with the East on 
the basis of "equality and mutual recognition ." Brezhnev responded affirmatively noting 
that the Soviet Union was far from ignoring the existing situation in Western Europe 
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rope (CSCE) has instituted new cooperative ventures with the East 
bloc."4 This conference which is being held in conjunction with the Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the talks on Mutual and Bal-
anced Force Reduction (MBFR) indicates that the focus will be on 
trade. The Community's task in this area is the development of a pene-
trating policy for cooperation and peace along with the facilitation of 
EEC integration with pan-European cooperation. 
Jahn contends that the CSCE is a vehicle for the development of a 
common foreign policy which is needed to implement the common trade 
policy. However, the single difficulty which has arisen in the CSCE is 
the discussion by Community Members of the free movement of people 
and ideas, be they for economic or social motives. Consequently, it may 
be noted that during the September 1973 meeting of the CSCE a Com-
munity foreign policy on the most rudimentary level concerning social 
penetration of the East bloc was initiated. The new EEC policy extend-
ing Community concerns beyond economics to the freer movements of 
information and ideas is a strategic error. The Community should not 
allow legitimate commercial concerns to be frustrated by the adoption 
of ill-conceived policies for the promotion of ideological concerns. This 
relatively new Community policy could prove to be the cause of ideologi-
cal subversion since it would compel interference in Soviet-East Euro-
pean internal affairs. Such an initiative would destroy the spirit of de-
tente which has been achieved through bilateral efforts. Therefore, overt 
foreign policy initiatives must remain with each Member State in the 
1970's at least until that point when political union is achieved by the 
EEC. 
Jahn, however, contends that no Member State should weaken the 
foreign trade policy function given to the Community by enacting new 
bilateral accords,5" and that if this occurs the Commission should take 
including the evolution of the EEC. 1972 FACTS ON FILE 363. This new ideology was 
reaffirmed by the Soviet Politburo in April 1973, calling for mutually beneficial foreign 
economic relations between the Soviet Union and the European Community. AGENCE 
EUROPE, July 27, 1973, at 1. 
54. The detente in part produced by Brandt's Ostpolitik has no doubt facilitated this 
international conference which had been sought by the East Europeans for a number of 
years . 
55. On January 1, 1973 all EEC nations were barred from conducting bilateral trade 
accords with the State-trading countries. Existing bilateral agreements are to terminate 
in 1974. 167 EUROMARKET NEWS 2 (1972). 
A Council Decision of December 16, 1969 stressed the progressive standardization of 
agreements concerning commercial relations between Member States and third countries. 
All negotiations with a view to conclusion of new treaties, agreements, arrangements or 
the amendment of existing accords were to be conducted in accordance with Community 
procedure after the end of the transitional period. All new agreements before being signed 
were to be checked to ensure that they would conform with joint conclusions. Therefore 
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measures as provided in Article 16956 of the Rome Treaty for failure of a 
Member State to fulfill the obligations set forth in Article 113,"7 by 
bringing the matter before the EEC Court of Justice. 
Furthermore, Jahn states that COMECON depends more on trade 
with the EEC than does the European Community upon its trade with 
the East,"x and that the COMECON Bank is dependent on long-term 
credits and loans from the EEC and is using the Euro-dollar market to 
gain medium-term loans. 59 He also maintains that the development of 
the Economic and Monetary Union supplies COMECON with a neces-
sary solution to the serious monetary discrepancies in COMECON 
trade, since East Europe has not solved its problem of non-convertibility 
of currencies. Consequently, Jahn concludes that a unified Western 
trade policy will not repulse COMECON trade. However, he fails to 
emphasize that the Member States would first have to harmonize their 
laws so that a universally accepted means of payment would be similar 
to national currencies. The harmonization of laws is not an easy task in 
that it requires much deliberation within each national parliament. 60 
Therefore, all new national provisions or the amendment of existing 
national laws that might cause distortion of competition must be closely 
scrutinized and weighed against the desires of the Commission for a 
common commercial policy. 
Jahn concludes by maintaining that the problem of bilateralism 
and multilateralism must be resolved. He finds that separate COME-
CON bilateral relations with the West jeopardize sales of products from 
other State-trading nations with Member States. Therefore the possibil-
ity of a setback of the economic growth of each COMECON member, 
the Member States were to notify the Commission of all bilateral accords. Consultation 
was to take place either by the initiative of the Commissions or at the request of a Member 
State. The consultation was to establish whether the bilateral agreements would consti-
tute an obstacle to the common commercial policy. Council Decision 69/494, O.J. No. L. 
326, p. 39, 29/12/69. 
56. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 169 states: 
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an 
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter 
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. 
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period 
laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court 
of Justice. 
57. See note 18 supra. 
58. Community trade with the State-trading countries accounts for only 7% of all 
foreign trade, while COMECON exports approximately 13% of their goods to the West, 
and Rumania alone sends 21.9% of her products to the Member States. EEC Doc. PE 32. 
956/rev., at 10. 17/3/73. 
59. Id. at 11 n.6. 
60. A single example is that the EEC has not yet been able to develop a common 
value-added tax system after years of appraisement. 
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as well as their increased efforts for cooperative integration may, indi-
cate that multilateralism will be the vogue for future trade relations. 
Although official recognition of the EEC by COMECON is immi-
nent, it is clear that the State-trading countries at present believe that 
relations between the Community and COMECON cannot supplant 
bilateral relations.61 Even though the Commission has the power tone-
gotiate trade accords with COMECON, the State-trading nations have 
insisted on their national prerogatives and counter Soviet initiatives to 
align COMECON as a single unit and therefore make the State-trading 
countries accessible to the European Community on a multilateral 
basis. Moreover, France's separate agreements with the East on cooper-
ation, signed in July 1973, run counter to the Community's supra-
national trade policy. There is at present a substantial tension between 
the creation of an integrated EEC commercial policy and the practice 
of concluding bilateral accords through wide-ranging economic agree-
ments which will cover the period to 1983.62 Most Member States have 
now followed France in cooperative ventures with the State-trading 
countries. The success of common external trade measures would seem 
to be dependent on each Member State's political attitudes towards the 
East bloc. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Western Europe's expansion of bilateral trade relations with the 
State-trading countries has opened the door for the return of East Euro-
peans to closer cooperation with the West on an economic basis. None-
theless, the insistence by some Member States for bilateral accords 
indicates that the goal of the Rome Treaty to develop a common com-
mercial policy will not be fully achieved. Although the prospects for a 
supra-national economic order have been revived by detente and the 
CSCE, the achievement of a unified external policy may only develop 
when the Member States perceive that economics must be determined 
within a political environment. 
At the present stage of political development, the EEC cannot fully 
achieve a common economic policy. Strong incentives toward supra-
national economic cooperation may encourage the nations of the East 
bloc to assess the European Community venture as part of the Soviet 
political ambition to centralize COMECON for its own purposes. There-
fore, official relations between the two divergent trading blocs may be 
counterproductive. COMECON has not developed an economic order 
comparable to that of the EEC and its members have preferred to deter-
mine distinct national trade policies. 
61. AGENCE EUROPE, July 31, 1973, at 1. 
62. AGENCE EUROPE, July 27, 1973, at 7. 
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Although the Common Agricultural Policy, the Common External 
Tariff and the abolition of intra-state restrictions to trade make it diffi-
cult for COMECON members not to approach the European Com-
munity as an economic unit, the most recent efforts toward bilateral 
cooperation agreements decrease the possibility of a perfected multilat-
eral external policy. 
Nevertheless, "multi-bilateral" relations may be a solution. Al-
though the Community is not a unified State, but rather sui generis, it 
is well suited for "multi-bilateral" accords, infusing a single Member 
State's trading ability with a supra-national diplomacy. A primary ex-
ample is Regulation No. 109/70,63 establishing common rules for imports 
from State-trading countries. Through this extraordinary capability, 
negotiations and international bargaining have developed effective co-
operation with groupings of countries: i.e., the Andean Group and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Consequently, such effective 
cooperation could be directed toward COMECON. With political union 
still in embryonic development, the Member States of necessity must 
rely upon bilateral contacts with COMECON States for the indefinite 
future. Nevertheless multilateral initiatives can and should be pre-
sented to COMECON in the areas of: technical trade, environmental 
protection, a uniform quota and liberalization system, common consult-
ation before conclusion of bilateral treaties, uniform long-term credit 
accords, the development of energy resources, the adoption of uniform 
rules on inter-bloc commerce and the uses of a safeguard clause. 
As both trading blocs slowly move toward integration, such evolu-
tion must not be construed by either bloc in purely ideological terms. 
The European Community can induce greater trade with the East only 
in an atmosphere of detente. The Community should continue to attract 
the Soviet Union to her commercial wealth allowing Moscow to take the 
initiative to unify COMECON. While the Member States will undoubt-
edly retain their individual and communal attitudes toward the East 
these must remain only a backdrop to commercial transactions; in so 
doing a subtle and unified foreign policy may well develop through 
economics. 
Carl Cannucciari 
63. See note 42 supra. 
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APPENDIX 
Development of EC-Trade by Most important Partner-Countries Extra-EC (broken 
down according to 1970 value) 
TABLE I: EXPORTS 
Situation (rank of 
Destination Millions of $ % of trade Trader) in 
1958 1965 1969 1970 1958 1969 1970 1958 1969 
U.S.S.R. 208 369 1065 1103 1.3 2.7 2.9 19 9 
Czech. 110 216 365 474 0.7 0.9 1.0 33 25 
Rumania 47 217 388 404 0.3 1.0 0.9 62 22 
Poland 141 204 378 388 0.9 1.0 0.9 28 23 
Hungary 58 156 233 336 0.4 0.6 0.7 52 34 
Development of EC Trade by Most Important Partner 
Countries Extra-EC (broken down according to 1970 value) 
TABLE II: IMPORTS 
Situation (rank 
Destination Millions of $ % of trade of Trader) in 
U.S.S.R. 
Poland 
Ru mania 
Czech. 
1958 1965 1969 1970 1958 1969 1970 1953 1969 
274 1000 913 962 1.7 2.3 2.1 17 
124 637 341 446 0.8 0.9 1.0 29 
60 172 287 369 0.4 0.7 0.8 56 
104 230 331 368 0.6 0.8 0.8 39 
TABLE III 
EC Share in Imports by Main Non-EC Countries; % of each Country's 
total imports in 1970 
Country 
U.S.S.R. 
Poland 
Czech. 
Hungary 
Bulgaria 
Rumania 
TABLE IV 
% 
10.0 
10.3 
11.7 
13.7 
7.9 
22.0 
EC Share in Exports by Main Non-EC Countries: % of each country's 
total exports in 1970 
Country % 
U.S.S.R. 6.7 
Poland 11.7 
Czech. 10.4 
Hungary 15.3 
Rumania 20.3 
Bulgaria 7.9 
7 
27 
33 
29 
Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities 99, 100, 101 (1970). 
1970 
8 
21 
25 
27 
30 
1970 
9 
27 
29 
30 
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